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Introduction 
Several	countries	embarked	on	a	path	characterised	by	market	




comes	 from	 hydropower	 plants),	 and	 having	 gone	 through	
two	 large	 institutional	 reforms	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	 years.	The	
first	reform	promoted	a	transition	from	the	vertical	integrated	
utility	 structure	 to	 a	market	where	 agents	 could	 freely	nego-








B.	 Implementation	of	 long-term	contracts	 (PPAs)	with	 avail-
ability	of	payment.	The	goal	was	to	promote	the	installation	
of	thermal	power	plants;
C.	Requirement	 that	 consumers	 must	 be	 fully	 supplied	 by	
energy	and	power	purchase	contracts,	and	all	contracts	must	
be	 registered	with	 the	 Brazilian	market	 operator	 (CCEE).	
Distribution	 utilities	 and	 free	 consumers	must	 ensure	 the	
compliance	of	100%	of	their	consumptions;
D.	Requirement	 that	sellers	must	have	enough	capacity	when	
selling	energy	and	power	 to	entirely	 implement	 their	con-







ulated	 Contracting	 Environment	 (single	 buyer	 model),	
encompassing	 around	 70%	 of	 the	market,	 and	 the	ACL	 -	
Free	 Contracting	 Environment	 (competition	 in	 the	 retail	
market),	with	 30%.	 In	 the	ACR,	 prices	 are	 determined	 by	
national	public	auctions	conducted	by	the	government	(one	
of	 the	main	 targets	of	 this	 scheme	 is	 to	provide	affordable	
tariffs	to	the	growing	economy)	while	in	the	ACL	prices	are	
freely	negotiated.
Despite	 these	 changes,	 the	 short-term	market	 price	 is	 not	 a	
result	of	the	market	participant’s	interactions,	and	the	dispatch	
is	performed	 in	a	centralised	way	by	 the	 ISO,	 such	 that	gen-
eration	companies	are	not	allowed	to	decide	their	own	genera-
tion	 in	order	 to	comply	with	their	contracts.	 In	addition,	 the	
mechanism	implemented	in	order	to	share	the	risk	of	not	being	
dispatched	 does	 not	 allow	 generators	 to	 develop	 their	 own	
strategy	according	to	their	risk	perception.
In	this	brief,	we	discuss	the	problems	and	dilemmas	that	have	
to	 be	 confronted,	 if	 a	 more	 conventional	 market-	 oriented	





Remarkable features of the Brazilian 
Electricity Market
Seasonalisation process
After	 closing	 a	 contract	 and	when	 the	 power	 plant	 becomes	






Instead	 of	 a	market-based	 approach,	 the	 dispatch	 is	 defined	
based	on	the	solution	of	a	minimum	operational	cost	problem	
that	 seeks	 a	 trade-off	 between	 saving	 water	 now	 and	 using	
thermal	fuel	(if	the	expectation	of	inflows	is	low),	or	using	water	
now	and	saving	 thermal	 fuel	 (if	 the	expectation	of	 inflows	 is	
favourable).	The	optimal	dispatch	problem	is	currently	solved	
through	 a	 stochastic	 dynamic	 and	 linear	 programming	 soft-
ware	package.	The	opportunity	water	 value	 is	one	of	 the	key	
elements	of	this	model	and	it	 is	set	to	examine,	among	other	





Mechanism for Reallocation of Energy
Since	the	dispatch	is	performed	in	a	centralised	way	by	the	ISO	
without	considering	the	contracted	energy,	the	Mechanism	for	
Reallocation	of	Energy	 (MRE)	 is	 then	 activated.	The	MRE	 is	
applied	to	hydros	that	committed	to	deliver	a	certain	amount	
of	electricity	(MWh)	during	a	specific	period,	at	a	pre-defined	
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price	1.	The	goal	of	this	mechanism	is	to	cover	the	risk	of	gen-





















In	 this	 current	 market	 design,	 the	 conciliation	 between	 the	
commercial	commitments	of	the	market	participants	and	the	
physical	dispatch	is	not	easily	accomplished.	In	Brazil	there	is	
no	 balancing	market;	 neither	 intraday	 or	 day-ahead	 options,	
nor	 future	markets.	 Instead,	 there	 is	 an	 annual	 “window”	 in	
which	 to	 monthly	 distribute	 the	 physical	 guarantee	 and	 the	
1.	 The	thermal	power	plants	usually	sign	contracts	to	receive	an	availabil-
ity	 payment	 plus	 an	 additional	 remuneration	 for	 each	MWh	effective	
produced.












their	bids.	Ultimately,	 this	 short-term	market	 is	not	 an	 envi-
ronment	where	market	participants	can	engage	in	short-term	
trades	on	their	own	account,	as	there	is	no	short-term	declara-
tion	 of	 intent.	Moreover,	 the	 price	 that	 values	 these	 transac-







The	 codes	 associated	with	 the	 software	 package	 used	 to	 run	
the	centralised	dispatch	are	under	intellectual	property	rights.	
Eventual	 inconsistencies	 in	 these	 algorithms	 have	 a	 huge	
impact	 within	 the	 entire	 sector,	 and	 the	 confidence	 of	 the	
market	can	be	affected.	Unfortunately,	during	2007	and	2011,	
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Dilemmas





that	must	 be	 faced,	 especially	 if	 considering	 a	 power	 system	
with	a	large	share	of	hydros.





safeguard	 the	 efficiency	of	 using	 the	 energy	 resources,	 i.e.	 to	
take	advantage	of	the	all	potential	energy	stored	in	the	cascade.
A	 decentralised	 dispatch,	 e.g.	 a	 scheme	 of	 bids	 in	 a	 market	
pool,	can	essentially	be	an	instantaneous	process	and	the	inter-
temporal	features	of	river	chain	operations	cannot	be	entirely	





Concerning	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 market	 to	 ensure	 sufficient	
capacity	 to	meet	 future	 demand,	 it	must	 be	 noted	 that	 gen-
erators	will	only	 invest	 in	new	power	plants	 if	 they	expect	 to	
recover	 their	 total	 costs.	Thus,	 considering	 a	 Brazilian	 elec-
tricity	market	 entirely	 reliant	 upon	 a	 short-term	market,	 the	
following	 question	 arises:	 Will	 the	 response	 of	 generators	





















€/MWh,	 this	 standard	 deviation	 imposes	 a	 huge	 risk	 to	 the	
health	of	the	business,	especially	regarding	the	stability	of	the	
cash	flow.
Finally,	 it	 is	 recognised	 that	 a	 capacity	mechanism	 is	needed	
in	order	to	provide	enough	incentives	to	ensure	the	security	of	
supply.	Nowadays,	this	concern	is	addressed	via	both	the	con-
tracting	 scheme	where	 the	demand	must	 be	 fully	 contracted	
ex-ante	and	contracts	physically	backed,	and	the	ISO	dispatch,	
either	through	the	mechanism	of	risk	aversion	in	the	software	
package,	 or	 through	 a	 dispatch	 according	 to	 the	merit	 order	
authorised	by	CMSE,	the	entity	that	monitors	the	supply	ade-
quacy	in	the	country.




tion	 defined	 by	 the	 ISO,	 and	 the	MRE	 is	 automatically	 per-
formed,	which	imposes	a	kind	of	“strait	jacket”	on	the	market	
participants.
Every	 time	 that	 the	PLD	 is	 high,	 there	 are	more	 dispatched	
thermal	 stations	 and	 less	 hydro	 stations.	 Depending	 on	 the	
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The proposed market design
The	Brazilian	market	design	is	lacking	a	level	of	flexibility	that	
would	allow	hydro	companies	to	adequately	manage	this	risk.	
Focused	 on	 improving	 flexibility	 for	 market	 participants	 to	
comply	with	 their	 contracts,	while	 still	 ensuring	 the	 efficient	


















Gain	  for	  the	  ISO:	  
• Positive image. 
Loss	  for	  the	  Agent:	  
• Agent lost opportunity to 
sell this energy spillage. 
 
Loss	  for	  the	  ISO:	  
• Negative image since 
ISO performance is 
lower than Agent. 
Gain	  for	  the	  Agent:	  
• In scenario of water 
scarcity, energy is more 
expensive, and agent has 
large amount of energy to 
offer. 
Time	  t0:	  	  Both	  systems	  (physical	  
and	  commercial)	  start	  equal	  
Time	  t1:	  ISO	  deposits	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  total	  
affluent	  natural	  energy	  in	  the	  virtual	  
reservoir	  
Decisions:	  
• ISO decides to use (physical effect) 









What	  did	  occur	  in	  the	  period?	  	  
High	  water	  inflows!	  
•  ISO took the best decision 
What	  did	  occur	  in	  the	  period?	  	  
Low	  water	  inflows!	  
• Agent took the best decision 
Virtual	  
spillage	  
	   Ti e	  t1:	  IS 	  deposits	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  total	  
affluent	  natural	  energy	  in	  the	  virtual	  reservoir	  
6 ■  FSR - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2014/07 ■ December 2014
The Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the European Commission. The 
Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory 
topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and policies.
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b.	 Regarding	 the	 quantity	 bid:	 each	 agent	 can	 offer	 any	
value	within	the	balance	of	his	account;
4.	 The	 final	 short-term	 market	 price	 is	 calculated	 as	 a	
weighted	 average	 considering	 the	 hydro	 short-term	
market	price	that	comes	from	the	hydro	virtual	short-term	








want	 to	withdraw	 from	 their	 virtual	 reservoirs	 to	meet	 their	
contracts.	To	do	that,	their	bids	have	to	be	accepted	in	an	auc-
tion	 that	will	 be	performed	as	 a	day-ahead	market.	 In	doing	
so,	each	generator	has	the	opportunity	to	manage	his	contracts	
more	 efficiently,	 without	 affecting	 the	 real	 operation	 of	 the	
physical	system.
Furthermore,	 this	model	 promotes	 a	monitoring	 of	 the	 ISO	
performance,	 based	 on	 comparisons	 between	 his	 decisions	
(the	physical	world)	and	the	market	participant	decisions	(vir-
tual	world).	To	illustrate	this	issue,	Figure	2	presents	a	scheme	
regarding	 the	 decision-	 making	 process	 in	 this	 new	 market	
design.
At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 process,	 prices	 no	 longer	 primarily	 result	
from	a	package	of	computational	models	that	may	eventually	
present	problems	related	to	inconsistencies	and	transparency,	
but	can	be	obtained	through	the	combination	of	thermal	costs	
based	on	the	ISO	dispatch	and	short-term	market	prices	arising	
from	the	hydro	short-term	market.
Thereby,	this	market	design	maintains	the	same	levels	of	effi-
ciency	and	security,	while	increasing	the	level	of	flexibility	for	
agents.	This	flexibility	can	be	achieved	by	replacing	 the	MRE	
and	the	seasonalisation	process	by	virtual	reservoir	models.	As	
a	result,	the	management	of	(virtual)	reservoirs	is	the	responsi-
bility	of	each	hydro,	which	could	save	(virtual)	water	according	
to	their	own	risk	perceptions	and,	in	doing	so,	the	operation	of	
the	physical	system	is	not	affected.
